Most studies of housing market liquidity twee measured liquidity in terms of time on the market (TOM), and have sought to explain TOM in terms of property characteristics and measures of market conditions. This paper departs from past studies of housing market liquidity by examining the spread between the listing and contract prices.
Previous Studies or Housing Market Liquidity
Most studies of housing market liquidity measure liquidity in terms of TOM and explain TOM in terms of property characteristics and measures of market conditions. Belkin, Hempel, and McLeavey (1976) show that TOM is negatively related to the ratio of the contract price to the listing price (the concession ratio). Miller (1978) demonstrates that TOM is positively correlated with selling price. His results are corroborated by Haurin (1988) , who shows that TOM is positively associated with the atypicality of a house. Since atypical houses tend to be more expensive houses, Haurin's results support those reported earlier by Miller: higher-priced, more atypical homes are more illiquid. Kluger and Miller (1990) develop a measure of liquidity that is closely related to TOM. They show that their liquidity measure is related to the characteristics of the house. Asabere, Huffman, and Mehdian (1993) show that overpricing, neighborhood, and interest rates affect TOM. And Kalra and Chan (1993) show that TOM is affected by regional economic conditions, with TOM being positively related to interest rates and negatively associated with area employment.
A Model of Housing Market Spreads
We assume that the home seller lists his property at the maximum price that he can expect to receive.
3 As Miller (1978) has argued, the seller adopts this strategy in the hopes of receiving all possible bids. The seller also has an acceptance price, (p'), such that if a buyer offers at least the acceptance price, the offer will be accepted. Otherwise, the offer will be rejected and the seller continues to receive bids.
The model assumes a process of sequential search. The assumptions necessary for optimality with sequential search have been defined by McCall (1970) . 4 Sellers accept bids from a pool of potential buyers. An individual offer is defined as 0 n , where the subscript defines the location of the offer in the sequence. Offers are distributed by the probability density function (O), which is known to the seller. The seller also knows Max O, which equals the list price p L .
It is assumed that the number of offers received per unit of time is constant. The seller sustains the cost of waiting to sell the house and the cost per offer (C) is constant. Any increase in the level of market activity lowers C.
The higher the acceptance price (p') set by the seller, the longer the Listing period, and thus, the higher the total cost of the transaction. In setting an acceptance price, the seller balances the expected gains from waiting for further bids against the cost of waiting.
Drawing on the results presented by McCall (1970) , it can be shown that the seller selects an acceptance price (p') so that the marginal cost of obtaining another offer (O) is equated with the expected marginal return of another offer:
where (O) is the probability distribution of offers. The cost, C, is the cost of searching for another offer. The right side is the expected marginal return of seeking another offer. Therefore, the calculation of the net return from the search for offers can be written:
where n is the number of offers and E(n) is the expected waiting time until a house is sold. By substituting equation 2 into (p L -p') / p L , the percent spread can be shown to be By the assumption that offers are independent and identically distributed, equation 2 can be expressed in terms of the probability density function of offers: Feinberg and Johnson (1977) 
. Therefore, the optimal contract price is given as where Z = (p' -μ)/σ (the standardized critical value) and P(Z) is the probability of an acceptable offer defined as follows:
Note that E(n), or TOM, also equals the reciprocal of the probability of accepting an offer, P(Z).
and taking the derivative of equation 7 with respect to the standard deviation of offers yields the following expression:
If the cost of search is large, equation 8 is inclined to have a negative sign. Hence, large search costs assure an inverse relationship between the standard deviation of offers and spread. An intuitive explanation is that a seller who is lucky can do better (i.e., sell at a higher acceptance price) when the standard deviation of offers rises. A larger standard deviation increases the chance that an offer will exceed the acceptance threshold. Thus, it is beneficial for the seller to set a higher acceptance price, or to narrow the discount from the list price that will be accepted.
The differentiation of equation 7 with respect to cost of search renders a derivative function that is always positive:
The positive derivative implies that higher search costs are associated with larger spreads. In particular, an important search cost is the interest rate. A seller who declines an offer forgoes the use of capital equal to the contract price (net of expenses) until an acceptable offer is found. A high opportunity cost may induce a seller to accept a low bid because it has a higher present value than a higher price received after a longer period of time (Miller, 1978) . Accordingly, the present value of the net selling price is maximized according to seller's opportunity cost of time (Miller and Sklarz, 1988) . A change in the interest rate alters the opportunity cost, and hence, the cost of search. In addition, an increase in overall market activity often accompanies a decline in interest rates, thereby decreasing the cost of search and, thus, lowering the spread. Other costs (such as advertising and personal selling) are typically not incremental when a seller employs an agent to sell his/her home, as these costs are usually borne by the seller's agent. 6 The cost of search is a critical determinant of the relation between list price and spread. The derivative of equation 7 with respect to list price shows an indeterminant relation that depends on the cost of search:
And, if μP(Z) + (Z)σ < C, then S/ p L < 0. Dividing both sides by P(Z) and rearranging, if μ + [ (Z)σ]/P(Z) -C/[P(Z)] > 0 then S/ p L > 0. Recall p' = μ + [ (Z)σ]/P(Z) -C/[P(Z)] from equation 5.
Since the acceptance price (p') is always greater than zero, the partial derivative shown in equation 10 is positive.
By rearranging equation 7, it can be shown that E(n), or expected time on the market (TOM), is given by the following:
By taking partial derivatives of the expression for expected time on the market, which is similar to equation 11, Haurin (1988) finds that standard deviation is positively related to TOM while search cost is negatively related to expected TOM.
Empirical Evidence
To test the theory of residential housing market spreads, we gathered data from the Board of REALTORS Multiple Listing Service in Greensboro, North Carolina, for the period from April 1991 through April 1993 (25 months). The data set contained 3,597 listings and selling prices and dates of sale for every house sold through the MLS. Monthly aver-ages were constructed for all variables. The monthly subsets of data consisted of an average of 144 housing sales per month; the minimum and maximum were 47 and 211 houses, respectively.
The model was operationally defined as follows: The average selling (or contract) priced of homes in the sample reflects the bid prices of home buyers that were accepted by sellers ( ). The mortgage interest rate (r t ) was introduced to reflect market activity and, thus, the cost of search. It is expected that the coefficient on r t should be positive, that is, higher mortgage rates reduce market activity and raise the cost of search, thereby raising the spread. Time on the market TOM t , captured as 1/P(Z) in equation 7, is anticipated to have a positive coefficient, consistent with prior research.
Descriptive statistics for the variables in the model are shown in Table I . The empirical estimates of the model are presented in Table 2 . The estimates were derived using the Cochrane-Orcutt technique for first-and secondorder autocorrelation correction. The first column in Table 2 shows the model estimates obtained using simple OLS. The second column presents estimates derived using two-stage least squares (2SLS), where both the spread (S t ) and time on the market (TOM t ) are treated as endogenous variables. The instrumental variables used to obtain the 2SLS estimates include the consumer price index, the unemployment rate, the percent changes in employment and residential building permits, the number of sales, the average list price, the standard deviation of selling prices, and the mortgage interest rate.
The empirical results shown in2 confirm the predictions of the theoretical model presented in the previous section. All of the variable coefficients in the estimated equations have the expected signs. All coefficients are statistically significant at the .05 level or better using a one-tail test, except for TOM t , which is not significant in either OLS or 2SLS regressions.
Higher list prices are shown to be associated with higher spreads. Thus, more highly priced houses appear to be more illiquid. This result conforms to that reported by Miller (1978) , who found higher list prices to be associated with higher TOM, that is, greater illiquidity.
A larger standard deviation in selling prices, as expected, is found to be negatively related to the spread. This negative association suggests that a wide price distribution may encourage sellers to hold out for higher acceptance prices. A higher variance in bid prices may stem from larger housing atypicality and a resulting deficiency of information about the market among buyers and sellers.
Higher mortgage rates (associated with a decline in market activity and higher search costs) are shown to raise the spread between the listing and contract prices, which is consistent with the notion that higher search costs lead to larger spreads as indicated in equation 9.
Tune on the market is positively related to spread; however, the coefficient is not statistically significant. This suggests that in the presence of other variables, TOM does not effectively explain variations in liquidity as measured by the percent spread.
Conclusion
Past studies of housing market liquidity have focused on time on the market (TOM). This paper shows that the spread between listing and selling prices also reflects market liquidity. It develops a theoretical model that demonstrates that housing stock liquidity is influenced by market information, transaction costs, the cost of housing, and time on the market.
The model of housing formulated in the paper is tested using housing market data from Greensboro, North Carolina. Empirical estimates of the model indicate that spreads are positively related to prices and transaction costs and negatively associated with the standard deviation of prices. Since spreads reflect market liquidity, the model suggests that liquidity is a function of transaction costs and market information.
